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THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE NEED FOR
ARTICULATE GOALS AT THE ACQUITTAL,
CO MITMENT, AND RELEASE STAGES
A society devising a rational legal system posits goals and then seeks
the best method of attaining them; to evaluate such a system it is appro-
priate to isolate the society's goals and to analyze the procedures chosen
for their implementation. This Note will examine rationales for permitting
an insanity defense and indicate weaknesses in procedures currently em-
ployed for post-trial disposition of persons raising the defense.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Rationales
Although rationales can be separated-for analytical purposes, the
separation is artificial. Different rationales may exert an influence at the
same time, and procedures to implement each may result in conflicts which
negate whatever social benefits might ensue if a choice were made in favor
of one rationale.
1. The Legalistic Rationale
A crime ordinarily consists of two elements:I an objective act and a
subjective state of mind, the mens rea,2 which may or may not require
specific intent. Since the state bears the burden of proving all elements
of a criminal offense, the accused's mental state is relevant even when he
does not formally interpose insanity as a defense. 3 Although some defend-
1 See HAIL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70-104 (2d ed. 1960);
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART 22-27 (2d ed. 1961).
2See DESsION, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER 55-56
(1948); KEETON & LLOYD, THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS
AND CONSTITUTIONS 105 (1955); PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 229-70 (1962).
3 The Model Penal Code expressly permits evidence "that the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect" to come in at trial "whenever it is relevant to prove
that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the
offense." MODEL PENAL CODE §4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The bill
currently before the Senate which alters District of Columbia procedure adopts the
Code rule verbatim. H.R. 7525, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1963).
At times, however, states have sought to exclude evidence bearing on the accused's
mental condition at trial either because they reject the defense of partial responsibility,
see note 8 infra, or because of specialized procedural provisions as in California,
for example, which employ the bifurcated trial procedure whenever the insanity
defense is raised. Because of this procedural arrangement the courts sought, for a
time, to exclude all psychiatric evidence from the first trial, in which the issue of
guilt was determined. See, e.g., People v. Leong Fook, 206 Cal. 64, 273 Pac. 779
(1928). The California courts ultimately abandoned this position and now hold
that to refuse to admit evidence bearing on the accused's mental ability in the first
trial would be a denial of due process when such evidence has bearing on whether
the accused could have the requisite mens rea. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d
330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949) ; People v. Webb, 143 Cal. App.
2d 402, 300 P.2d 130 (Dist. Ct App. 1956); DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ,
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ants who plead insanity could simply contend that they lacked the requisite
mens rea,4 the insanity defense is broader than the mens rea concept. For
example, substitution of a mens rea inquiry for the insanity defense would
not result in exoneration for a defendant charged with crimes requiring no
specific mental element.5  Moreover, if insanity is a defense primarily
because it negates mens rea, it seems that mental weaknesses short of
insanity might be used for the same purpose. In Fisher v. United States,6
in which the accused was convicted of first-degree murder, the Su-
preme Court held that the District of Columbia district court had not
erred when it gave the jury a M'Naghten instruction but refused to
charge that the evidence of defendant's limited mental ability could also
be considered in connection with the mens rea requirements of premedita-
tion and deliberation. 7 According to the court, such a charge would
CRIMINAL LAW 688-90 (1962); Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The
Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIn. L. R-Ev. 805 (1961); cf. Stewart v. United States, 214
F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945),
aff'd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946) (evidence of borderline mentality admissible in murder
prosecution, but refusal to charge on partial responsibility held no error) ; Goldstein
& Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 865 n.40
(1963).
4 See Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 645, 655 (1963). See generally Goldstein & Katz, supra note 3.
5 In some situations lack of mens rea functions as the sole exculpatory device.
For example, an autonomic act is not punishable. See Fain v. Commonwealth, 78
Ky. 183 (1879) (court's rejection of evidence on defendant's somnambulistic tendencies
held error) ; Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans,
5 RES JUDIcATAE 29 (1951) (report on King v. Cogdon, Supreme Court of Victoria,
1950). Such an act is "automatic and apparently undirected symbolic behavior which
is not consciously controlled." AamcAN PSYCHIATRIc ASS'N, A PSYCHIATRIc GLos-
sARY 4-5 (1957). Somnambulism is "a general automatism occurring in the course
of, and interrupting normal sleep." HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, A TEXTBOOIC OF PSY-
cHIATRY 125 (7th ed. 1950) ; cf. People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1948).
Similarly, intoxication is generally held to negate specific intent. Thus, although
a defendants intoxication will not completely exonerate him, it may reduce the degree
of the offense. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954) (de-
cision based on provision of California Penal Code); People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y.
147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926). In Proctor v. United States, 177 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(per curiam), evidence of the defendant's intoxication was held immaterial since the
crime-using an automobile without the owner's consent-did not require a specific
intent. See also PAULSEN & KAnISH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 356-59.
6149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
7 The instruction requested by the defense attorney was the following:
[Y]et if the jury find from the evidence that there was such a degree of
mental unsoundness existing at the time of the homicide as to render the
defendant incapable of premeditation and of forming such an intent as the
jury believe the circumstances of this case would reasonably impute to a
man of sound mind, they may consider such degree of mental unsoundness in
determining the question whether the act was murder or manslaughter.
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 471 n.9 (1946); cf. LINDMAN & McINlTYE,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 255-57 (1961). Compare Fisher v. United
States, supra, with Washington v. State, 165 Neb. 275, 85 N.W.2d 509 (1957) (error
to instruct jury to consider the defendant's level of intelligence solely in connection
with penalty).
The traditional M'Naghten instruction is the following:
[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be
sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his
crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to estab-
lish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
[Vo1.112:733
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
amount to a recognition of the defense of partial responsibility 8 without
legislative approval.9
Taken to its logical conclusion, the legalistic rationale that insanity is
a defense because it negates mens rea would require complete discharge
from criminal custody of an accused acquitted by reason of insanity since
the state has, by hypothesis, failed to prove one of the elements of the
offense.10 However, other considerations often dictate that the acquitted
defendant be committed to a mental institution."
2. The Community Sentiment Rationale
The community's basic notions of fairness influence the jury to resist
inflicting punishment on an "insane" defendant even though he has engaged
in proscribed conduct.12 Notions of fairness may also be responsible for
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
In contrast, the charge given under the Durham rule is the following:
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was
not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he
committed the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe
he was suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he com-
mitted the act, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not
the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. Unless
you believe beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering from
a diseased or defective mental condition, or that the act was not the product
of such abnormality, you must find the accused not guilty by reason of in-
sanity.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
8 Partial responsibility "rests on the proposition that a defendant should not be
held responsible for a degree of crime requiring as one of its elements a mental state
that he was incapable of achieving." LINDAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 355. See, e.g., State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249 (1950) ; WIHOFEN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CamINAL DEFENSE 189 (1954). Diminished responsibility, on the
other hand, is an English doctrine imported from Scottish practice which permits
the reduction of a murder charge to manslaughter when the defendant suffered from
an "abnormality of mind . . . [which] substantially impaired his mental responsi-
bility for his acts . . . " Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, §2(1).
) Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476 (1946).
10 The jury would, of course, have the option in a murder case of convicting the
accused of a lesser offense, e.g., second degree murder or manslaughter. What is
contemplated here is the defendant's release when the jury returns an acquittal verdict.
"1 Twelve states and the District of Columbia provide for automatic mandatory
commitment, see note 46 infra, of the acquitted defendants: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-4 (Supp. 1960) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503
(1953); KAN. GEN . STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1949); Me. Laws 1963, c. 311, § 17-C;
MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 101 (1957) (in cases of murder and manslaughter
only); MIcH. Coamy. LAwS § 766.15c (1948) (in cases of murder only); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1962); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2203 (1956); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 175.445 (1961) ; N.Y. CODE C-M. PROC. § 454; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39
(Page 1953); WIs. STAT. § 957.11(3) (1961). For an articulation of some of the
factors which may compel a legislature to enact a mandatory commitment law see
S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
12 See Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ("Our
collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.").
In an analogous area, English juries often understated the amount of money taken in
a theft case to avoid imposition of the capital, penalty. See 1 RADzINoWIcz, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISE CIMxINAL LAW 94-97 (1948).
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legislative judgments establishing the insanity defense. In one of the
early drafts of the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute at-
tempted to codify community sentiments into an insanity rule. The pro-
posal would have permitted the jury to determine whether or not the
capacity of an accused "either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law" was so substantially
impaired that he could not "justly be held responsible." 13 This formula-
tion was ultimately rejected, presumably because of its imprecision' 4 __
unguided juries in different sections of the community have varying stand-
ards of justice.' 5 Although it is quite clear that different juries may have
different ideas of what constitutes, for example, insanity or reasonableness,
these concepts have a legal flavor and the jury will presumably be made
aware of the fact that it is applying legal criteria and not merely common
sense. Furthermore, it is possible for the judge to limit the range within
which the jury may act arbitrarily. No such limitation is possible when
the jury is instructed to determine what the community's basic notions of
fairness are. Adoption of an exculpatory standard which gives the jury
definite directions is preferable since it provides some uniformity at least
on a formal level.16
13 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1), alternative formulation (a) (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
14 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955):
Alternative (a) proposes to submit the issue squarely to the jury's sense
of justice . . . . Some members of the Council deemed it unwise to present
questions of justice to the jury, preferring a submission that in form, at least,
confines the inquiry to fact. The proponents of the alternative contend that
since the jury normally will feel that it is only just to exculpate if the dis-
order was extreme, that otherwise conviction is demanded, it is safer to
invoke the jury's sense of justice than to rest entirely on the single word
"substantial," imputing no specific measure of degree.
15 Community sentiment may of course be different in various geographic areas.
In addition, the jury may not be fairly representative of the community. See Broeder,
The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 386 (1954). "In
addition to being an inconsistent law-dispenser, the jury is in many respects a highly
unrepresentative one. If the jury is designed to function as a minor legislature it
should represent a total cross-section of the community." Id. at 412-13; cf. DONNELLY,
GOLDSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 3, at 126-31.
16 Despite widespread criticism of the jury system as irrational, see, e.g., FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 109-25 (1950), results of the University of Chicago Law School's
Jury Project indicate that jurors take the performance of their function more seri-
ously than bad previously been assumed. GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 128 (1959) ; James, Jurors' Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 SocIAl.
PROBLEMS 58, 68 (1959). Thus, some control over the scope of the deliberations
appears to be possible through the instructions given by the trial judge.
The jury acts as a safety valve; it is a "built-in check on the rigour and inflexi-
bility of the law." THE HUMANIST FRAME 337 (Huxley ed. 1961). To some extent
it is desirable that the jury temper the law with its concept of community standards
of justice. However, the jury's discretion to disregard the law to achieve a more
just result is limited by the legal system itself. Thus, it may be proper to charge the
jury on the offense for which the accused is being tried and all the lesser included
offenses only if there is evidence on all elements of a lesser included offense. See
People v. Stevens, 272 N.Y. 373, 6 N.E.2d 60 (1936). This procedure may result
in the entry of a compromise verdict which is permitted within limits, as long as
there is evidence to sustain the compromise verdict. See Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390 (1932) (inconsistent jury verdicts upheld). However, a jury determi-
nation of whether the defendant could "justly be held accountable" contains no such
limits.
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Commitment to a mental institution after acquittal is less objectionable
under a fairness rationale than under a legalistic one, since confinement in
a mental institution need not be equated with punishment by the com-
munity. Moreover, additional pressures favoring the protection of the
community may justify some -type of commitment for defendants acquitted
by reason of insanity.17
3. The Pragmatic Rationale
The insanity defense may be viewed as practically serving one or more
of the desirable goals of criminal law-individual 18 and general ' 9 deter-
rence, incapacitation, and reformation. This is not to suggest that any of
these goals should be viewed in isolation. If, for example, general deter-
rence were the only consideration, an acquitted offender might be released
completely following the jury verdict; however, the adoption of such a
procedure might disserve the reformative goal.20 On the other hand,
mandatory commitment following an acquittal by reason of insanity may
serve several goals simultaneously.2 ' Institutionalization of an acquitted
defendant has clear penal overtones, but mandatory commitment statutes
have survived constitutional attack.2 Under such statutes acquittal by
reason of insanity is different from an ordinary acquittal. Although the
conventional acquittal formula of "not guilty" is employed, the conse-
17 See, e.g., Guttmacher, Principal Difficulties With the Present Criteria of Re-
sponsibility and Possible Alternatives, in MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. B (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955) ("It seems to me prudent to recommend such procedure [manda-
tory commitment], since the community needs the assurance that actual recovery has
occurred and that there is no likelihood of imminent recurrence.") ; S. REP. No. 1170,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) ("The Committee believes that a mandatory com-
mitment statute would add much to the public's peace of mind, and to the public
safety, without impairing the rights of the accused.").
18 In theory the criminal law is supposed to operate as a deterrent. When,
however, an individual is so mentally deranged as not to know the difference between
right and wrong he is incapable of rationally directing his conduct and he will not be
deterred by the threat of punishment Cf. ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL,
THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 78-79 (1956).
29 However, the community's sense of justice may be disturbed by the sight of an
insane man being executed, for example. A widespread sense of injustice may lead
to disrespect for, rather than obedience to, the law. See ARENS & LASSWmL, IN
DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER 24 (1961); Silving, Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law,
2 CURRENT LAw & SOCIAL PROBLEmS 1, 7 (1961).
2 0 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Bok of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dissenting in
Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 265-66, 164 A.2d 98, 110 (1960):
I favor combatting crime by keeping a felon in prison, regardless of his
offense, until he has been shown to be criminally harmless and no longer a
menace to society. . . . The Rule [M'Naghten] is a ready method of quali-
fying defendants for conviction and imprisonment, but also for their release
without regard for their criminal tendencies. To free dangerous people
when they should remain locked up is stupid and has the opposite effect of
protecting society. The Rule does this and hence is the keystone of a vengeful
rather than a curative system.
21 See pages 743-47 infra.
22 See, e.g., Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 Pac. 769 (1930); People v.
Dubina, 304 Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 766 (1943) ; cf. Orencia
v. Overholser, 163 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1947). But see Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705 (1962).
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quences which follow indicate that a more proper verdict might be "guilty
but insane." 23
There are compelling reasons why an exponent of the pragmatic
approach might support post-acquittal commitment for insane defendants.
The desirability of incapacitating an individual who has perpetrated an
unlawful act will weigh in favor of post-acquittal commitment. Blanket
release for acquitted defendants may diminish the law's deterrent effect on
noninsane members of the community. In addition, many individuals
may feel a sense of injustice when an offender is set free without punish-
ment.24 Even though a psychiatrist might categorize such reactions as
pathological, 25 their influence will undoubtedly be reflected in the legal
system. 26 Similarly, if one of the purposes of the legal system is to
maximize the sense of security in the society, this goal will not be served
if members of the community believe the legal system operates to permit
dangerous individuals to go free.
27
Immediate release following an insanity acquittal may encourage of-
fenders to feign insanity to avoid punishment.28 Even if there were absolute
certainty that those feigning insanity would be detected by psychiatrists,29
23 The Royal Commission objected to the use of such a verdict since it resulted
in the branding of insane individuals as criminal. See Commission on Capital Punish-
ment, Report, CMD. No. 8932, at 156-57 (1953). The suggestion here is not that
such a procedure should be adopted, but that such a verdict form would more accu-
rately reflect the disposition to be made of criminal defendants acquitted by reason
of insanity. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YA.LE L.J. 543, 544 n.4
(1960).
24 See Letter From the Late Judge Learned Hand to the University of Chicago
Law Review, reprinted in 22 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 319 (1955):
[M]ost people have a feeling that "justice" reqtires a law breaker to suffer,
just as they think that sin should entail suffering in the sinner. Personally
I do not share that feeling, which is a vestige, I believe, of very ancient
primitive and irrational beliefs and emotions. However, it would be unwise,
and incidentally impracticable to disregard it as a constituent element; it is
extremely strong in most people.
25 See ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra note 18, at 213-17; FLUGEL, MAN,
MORALS AND SOCIETY 168-70 (1945); Hill, The Psychological Realisn of Thurman
Arnold, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 377, 388-89 (1955).
26 See cases cited note 31 infra; cf. ARENS & LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 24; HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 41 (1881) : "The first requirement of a sound
body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of
the community, whether right or wrong." Mr. Justice Holmes' idea is not without
its limitations. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Cf. ARENS & LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 111-12.
28 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962).
29 The psychiatric profession's diagnostic and predictive abilities are somewhat
inadequate at present. See 2 FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS 227 (Riviere transl. 1950):
Even supposing that we thoroughly know the aetiological factors that decide
a given result, still we know them only qualitatively, and not in their relative
strength. Some of them are so weak as to become suppressed by others, and
therefore do not affect the final result. But we never know beforehand which
of the determining factors will prove the weaker or the stronger. We only
say at the end that those which succeeded must have been the stronger. Hence
it is always possible by analysis to recognize the causation with certainty,
whereas a prediction of it by synthesis is impossible.
See generally MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954); Ash, The
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 272 (1949).
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the burden on the courts and the psychiatric profession occasioned by
increased use of the insanity defense would be undesirable.80 Finally, if
the jury members know that the defendant will be unconditionally released
following an acquittal by reason of insanity, they may be more reluctant to
acquit on this ground.31 If the jury finds such a defendant guilty, he will
be sentenced to a penal institution where psychiatric treatment may be
inadequate. Of course, if a convict is mentally ill, he may be transferred
to a mental institution; however, when he arrives via this route rather
than by civil commitment, he may be segregated from the institution's
other inmates and have limited privileges because of his "prisoner" status.
8 2
Such treatment will only emphasize the penal nature of his restraint and
may make psychiatric therapy correspondingly more difficult. 83
30 There would undoubtedly be an increase. "Prior to the Durham decision less
than 1 percent of the criminal cases tried in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia resulted in verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. . . . [In]
February of 1961 it was 25 percent." H.R. REP. No. 563, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5
(1961).
The following statistics regarding the number of acquittals by reason of insanity
tend to show either that the defense is being raised more frequently or that the
Durham standard permits more acquittals than the old M'Naghten standard.
Defendants Verdicts of Not Guilty






Appellee's Petition for Rehearing en Banc, p. 8 n.11, Campbell v. United States, 307
F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See generally Clayton, Six Years After Durham, 44 J.
Am. JuD. Soc'y 18 (1960).
81 The jury's concern with the disposition of an acquitted defendant is reflected
in cases where the jury returns from its deliberations to inquire whether the defend-
ant would be set free if acquitted. In the District of Columbia Circuit it is reversible
error for a judge to fail to instruct the jury, when defense counsel desires it, that
an acquitted defendant is automatically committed to a mental institution. See
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam) ; Catlin v.
United States, 251 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (defense counsel should
not have informed jury of consequences of acquittal by reason of insanity since it
was judge's duty); Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Lyles
v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (separate opinion of Prettyman
& Burger, JJ.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958). The argument against such instruc-
tions is, of course, that punishment is not a proper consideration for the jury which
is only a trier of facts, and that informing the jury of the penalties may lead to a
compromise verdict. See Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962);
Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 834
(1949) ; cf. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'd per
curiam, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) ; Dicks v. United States, 253 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1958).
Proposed amendments to the D.C. Code prohibit telling the jury of the consequences
of the acquittal by reason of insanity. See H.R. 7525, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(1963). However, in Lyles, supra, the court states that since the jury knows the
consequences of the other two verdicts it "has a right to know the meaning of this
possible verdict [acquittal by reason of insanity] as accurately as it knows by common
knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts." 254 F.2d at 728.
2 Prisoners transferred to a mental institution from a penitentiary may be placed
in a closed ward both to protect other patients and to prevent their escape. See
generally GREENBLAT, Yom & BROWN, MENTAL HosprTALs (1955).
3See ABRAHAMSEN, WHO AmE THE GuiLTY? 232 (1952) ; ARENs & LASSWEML,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 106-07; Johnston, Sources of Distortion and Deception in
Prison Interviewing, 20 Fed. Prob., March 1956, p. 43; Sorensen, Interviewing Prison
Inmates, 41 J. CRns. L., C. & P.S. 180 (1950).
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B. The Meaning of Acquittal: Significance of the Burden of Proof
1. When the Prosecution Bears the Burden
In a criminal prosecution, the accused is presumed sane; 34 when sanity
is not in issue, the prosecution need not prove it.35 Once the issue has been
raised by the defendant's offering some evidence, however, proof of the de-
fendant's sanity becomes part of the prosecution's case in most jurisdictions
either beyond a reasonable doubt 6 or, as has been suggested, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.3 7 Because of the ease with which the defense
can place the burden on the prosecution, there may be a great temptation for
the defendant to raise the sanity issue.38 But when it is the defendant who
must prove he was insane at the time of the offense he may hesitate to raise
the defense unless he has good reason to believe he will succeed.
In a jurisdiction in which the prosecution bears the burden of proving
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, a verdict of acquittal
"by reason of insanity" need not indicate an affirmative finding that the
defendant was insane at the time of the crime, but only that the prosecution
failed to convince the trier of fact that the accused was sane at that time.3 9
From a psychiatric point of view, mandatory commitment solely on the
basis of the jury verdict in such jurisdictions is undesirable since there
has been no specific finding that the defendant was insane.40
34WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 (1954): "Sanity
being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed, in the
first instance, upon the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible
when the act was committed. To this rule all courts agree."
35 To require the Government to prove defendant's sanity in every case "would
seriously delay and embarass the enforcement of the laws against crime, and in most
cases be unnecessary." Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895) (dictum).
36 In twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra
note 34, at 241-72; Territory v. Adiarte, 37 Hawaii 463, 469 (1947) ; State v. Violett,
111 N.W.2d 598, 607 (S.D. 1961) (dictum) ; State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 588, 115
N.W.2d 505, 516 (1962).
37 At present there are apparently no jurisdictions in which the state has the
burden of proving the defendant's sanity by a preponderance of the evidence. See
WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 241-72. But see Comment, Professor George
H. Dession's Final Draft of the Code of Correction for Puerto Rico, 71 YALE L.J.
1050, 1095 (1962) :
Since the proper disposition of an offender is as much a concern of the state
as of the offender, the code provides that it shall be the duty of the prose-
cutor or court as well as the attorney for the offender to raise the issue of
responsibility. . . . It is not, however, clear why such finding . . . must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt . . . since the issue does not go to
the participation of the defendant in a situation, upon which invocation of
the code is predicated, but to the disposition of the offender after such par-
ticipation is established. If retribution is irrelevant to all such dispositions,
arguably the question of responsibility need not require such a high quantum
of proof.
38 Compare ABA CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS 5 with id. 30.
39 See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Fahy, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).4 0 Automatic mandatory commitment statutes have survived constitutional attack.
See Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). But cf. Lynch v. Over-
holser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
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Despite the fact that in a jurisdiction in which the prosecution bears
the burden of proof mandatory commitment may be psychiatrically unsound,
other values may influence the legislature's decision to require this result.
For example, legislators may feel that the community needs optimum pro-
tection from such individuals which can only be achieved if they are institu-
tionalized,41 or that the release -of these defendants may encourage other
members of the community to engage in lawless conduct. Certainly institu-
tionalization of such defendants would prevent them from violating the
law at least during the period of their restraint, and it might discourage
other potential offenders from attempting to use the insanity defense to gain
early release.
If the prosecutor's burden were to show sanity by a preponderance
of the evidence, the psychiatric considerations opposing mandatory commit-
ment are less weighty. Because of the ease with which the prosecution
could meet a preponderance burden, a jury acquittal by reason of insanity
would be more indicative of an affirmative finding of insanity than in a
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt jurisdiction.4
2. When the Defense Bears the Burden
In a jurisdiction in which the defense bears the burden of proving
insanity, acquittal by reason of insanity represents an affirmative finding
that the accused was insane at the time of the offense.43
Twenty-three states44 place the burden of proving insanity on- the
accused. Allocating the risk of error to the defendant in this situation is not
unfair since he is attempting to refute the ordinary presumption of sanity
and may therefore have to establish any circumstances entitling him to
41 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955).
42 If a jurisdiction adopts the preponderance rule, the burden the prosecution
would have to bear is not as stringent as in a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt jurisdiction.
Considering the fact that most juries are reluctant to acquit on the ground of in-
sanity, if the prosecution is unable to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain this
burden and the jury acquits, it is highly likely that the accused was suffering from
a mental disorder at the time of the crime. See Reid, Disposition of the Criminally
Insane, 16 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 75, 112 (1961).
43 There is no constitutional prohibition preventing any state from placing the
burden of proving insanity on the defendant. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
The defendant challenged, under the due process clause, the Oregon statute which
placed the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on him. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute. But see Frankfurter, J., dissenting:
Oregon is the only one of the Forty-eight States that has made inroads upon
that principle [forcing the prosecution to prove guilt] by requiring the accused
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of one of the essential ele-
ments for the commission of murder, namely culpability for his muscular
contractions.
Id. at 804-05. The Oregon statute has since been amended; now the defendant bears
the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Om REv.
STAT. § 136.390 (1961).
4 4 
WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 212. The burden is also on defendant
in Alaska. See Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1962). It is unclear where
the burden of proof lies in Arizona, Maryland, and North Dakota.
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exculpation. 45 In addition, requiring the defendant to prove his insanity
may decrease the number of spurious insanity defenses.
When a defendant bearing the burden of proof is acquitted by reason
of insanity, the acquittal represents an affirmative finding that he was insane
at the time of the offense. Here there would be more psychiatric justifica-
tion for some type of post-acquittal treatment.
II. GOAL CHOICES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
POST-ACQUITTAL STAGE
Once it has been determined that some type of post-acquittal disposi-
tion is in order for a defendant exculpated by reason of insanity, the problem
becomes one of selecting the best procedure for implementing the goals
chosen. Separation of "insane" defendants from those to be treated as
ordinary offenders takes place at the trial stage; in a mandatory commit-
ment jurisdiction,4 6 the only separating mechanism is the exculpatory rule-
whether M'Naghten, Durham, irresistible impulse, or the Model Penal
Code formulation. If the goals of mandatory commitment are therapeutic
and protective, the exculpatory rule should be designed to isolate only
those individuals who need treatment and from whom the society needs
protection; 47 otherwise psychiatric facilities will not be utilized in the most
efficient manner. None of the exculpatory rules focuses on either the de-
fendant's amenability to treatment or his danger to the community; 48
thus, although they exculpate the defendant, they do not determine whether
he should be set free or confined to an institution.
A. Treatment as the State's Dominant Goal
1. When the Burden Is on the Defendant
In this situation, an acquittal by reason of insanity represents an
affirmative finding that the accused was insane at the time of the offense,
45 LiNn.Ax & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 351.
46 A mandatory commitment jurisdiction is one in which the judge must commit
the defendant to a mental institution following his acquittal by reason of insanity.
An automatic mandatory commitment jurisdiction is one in which the defendant is
committed without further inquiry into his mental state. In some mandatory commit-
ment jurisdictions there are further proceedings; the acquitted defendant must be
committed only when the proceedings reveal that he remains insane or dangerous
or both. In this Note "mandatory commitment jurisdiction" will refer to a jurisdic-
tion which requires further proceedings following defendant's acquittal; when de-
fendant's commitment follows his acquittal without further inquiry the jurisdiction
will be referred to as an "automatic mandatory commitment jurisdiction." All other
jurisdictions which permit institutionalization of acquitted defendants will be referred
to as "discretionary commitment jurisdictions."
47See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
48The exculpatory rule may perform a different function; it is employed at the
trial stage and permits the jury to make a moral judgment phrased in terms of right
and wrong. 'Every criminal trial conveys a moral lesson . . . . [T]his function
of the criminal trial is vital to the maintenance of a moral order . . . ." RocHFi
TE CRIMINAL MIND 79 (1958).
[Vo1.112:733
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
but it does not follow that this insanity continues up to the time of the
trial.4 9
When the jurisdiction uses the M'Naghten rule as its separatory
device, the degree of mental impairment necessary before a defendant can
qualify for exculpation is quite high," and a person so impaired might con-
ceivably be commitable under a standard civil commitment statute.51
Because the M'Naghten rule is not an accurate index of either danger-
ousness or amenability to treatment, but merely represents a standard the
community regards as minimal before penal sanctions may be imposed,
many states provide for separate proceedings following an insanity acquittal
in which the inquiry is whether or not the acquitted defendant is still insane
or dangerous.52
a. Mandatory Commitment
Even though automatic mandatory commitment of defendants acquitted
by reason of insanity may be undesirable since it can result in the crowding
of institutions with untreatables, other goals may be served by such a plan.
The defendant, while institutionalized, will be unable to violate the law;
thus the goal of incapacitation is served. The general deterrent function
is arguably strengthened since the society will not have to face the anomaly
of freeing a man who has engaged in criminal conduct. The society's
retributive instincts will also be gratified since some seemingly punitive
action is being taken against the offender.
When the Durham rule performs the separating function, there may
be even more reason for having a separate inquiry into the defendant's
49 The defendant may recover temporarily or permanently. A temporary recovery
is known as a remission; at times it is difficult to determine whether a given individual
has recovered or is merely in a state of remission. But see S. REP. No. 1170, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) : "[I]t is just and reasonable . . . that the insanity, once
established, should be presumed to continue and that the accused should automatically
be confined for treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered." For a precise
psychiatric definition of remission see nQte 76, infra. See NoYEs & KoLn, MODEN
CLixCicAL PSYCHIATRY 416-17 (5th ed. 1958). "In some cases the course [of schizo-
phrenia] is continuously progressive; in others it is intermittent. More frequently
it is a question of remissions and relapses which [sic] . . . there occur periods of
adjustment at a lower level for a considerable period of time." Recurrences of
manic depressive psychosis are "not uncommon." Id. at 369. See also LANDis &
BOLLES, TEXTOOK OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 128 (rev. ed. 1950).
50 "[W]e knov that most inmates of institutions for the insane, if examined in
regard to their knowledge of right and wrong, would pass the test perfectly." Gutt-
macher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 325, 328 (1955) ;
see Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An. Effort To Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 771, 776 (1962).
51 Civil commitment standards are diverse. Only five jurisdictions retain danger-
ousness to himself and others as the sole involuntary hospitalization criterion; other
states permit involuntary hospitalization on the basis of the patient's need for care.
See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 50,
§§ 1203(c), 1072(11) (1954), provide for involuntary hospitalization when an indi-
vidual suffers from a mental illness which "so lessens the capacity of a person to
use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs
and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care."
5 2 E.g., Ky. R. CPI. P. 9.90(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84 (Supp. 1963), in
which separate proceedings are required.
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mental condition following his acquittal. As in the case of the M'Naghten
rule, Durham is not an accurate index of the defendant's dangerousness or
amenability to treatment; in theory at least the rule permits acquittal of de-
fendants less seriously impaired than defendants acquitted under the
M'Naghten rule. As the exculpatory requirements are more relaxed, the
possibility increases that some defendants not needing confinement may be
acquitted.53 Such individuals would not be amenable to treatment, and to
institutionalize them, except for purposes of observation, would be a waste
of institution space.
At present only twelve states and the District of Columbia provide
for automatic mandatory commitment of acquitted insanity defendants; 5
in seventeen states an acquitted insanity defendant will be committed only if
his insanity continues, 55 and in three additional states a defendant will be
committed only if the civil commitment standards are met.5 6
Automatic mandatory commitment of acquitted defendants may deter
defendants from raising the insanity defense except in the most serious
offenses. 57 To the extent that the insanity defense is designed to secure
rehabilitative therapeutic treatment, this goal is disserved when potential
patients are deterred from raising the defense.58 An additional factor
which may discourage reliance on the defense is the length of time defend-
ants have served in mental institutions following their acquittal.59 If a
defendant ends up in a penal institution because he was deterred from
raising the insanity defense, psychiatric treatment is rendered increasingly
difficult. The penal environment is not an ideal milieu in which to attempt
53 Congress was undoubtedly cognizant of this danger; the statutory require-
meat that all defendants acquitted by reason of insanity be committed to a mental
institution was inserted in the District of Columbia Code immediately following the
celebrated Durham decision. See S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1955).
54 See note 11 supra.
55
ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 429 (1958); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026; HAWAII REv. LAWS
§ 258-38 (Supp. 1961) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2320 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1704(a) (Supp. 1961) (or
if recurrence highly probable); Ky. R. Ca.i. P. 9.90(2); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59,
§ 8(a) (Supp. 1963); MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 101 (1957) (in all cases except
murder and manslaughter) ; MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 76727 (Supp. 1961) (cases other
than murder) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 2575 (1956) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.510 (Supp.
1962); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §94-7420 (1947); NJ. STAT. ANN. §2A:163-3
(1953) ; TEX. CODE CRrm. PRoc. art. 932b, § 1 (Supp. 1963) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 10.76.040 (1961) (still insane or danger of recurrence) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6198
(1961).
56See ARiz. R. CRrb. P. 288; LA. REv. STAT. §§28:53, 28:59 (1950); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 7-242 (1957).
57 See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705
(1962) ; Note, Implementation and Clarification of the Durham Criterion of Criminal
Irresponsibility, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 1253, 1267 (1958).
58 See SCHwARTz, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JusTICE 183 (1961).
59 See Clayton, Six Years After Durham, 44 J. Am. JUD. Soc'v 18, 21 (1960):
In all 29 cases, with the exception of the three murderers, those released as
cured have spent just about about as long in the hospital as they would have
spent in prison if they had been convicted and sentenced. . . . Almost anyone
in his right mind would prefer a term in prison to a term in a mental hospital.
60 See note 33 supra; SAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 144 (1963).
[Vo1.112:733
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
psychiatric therapy6 In addition, the other prisoners' attitude tends to dis-
courage him from seeing a psychiatrist.6' If a prisoner is psychotic he
may, of course, be transferred to a mental institution; 6 2 however, only the
most disturbed prisoners will usually benefit from such transfer provisions.
On the other hand, defendants may be encouraged to employ the
insanity defense more frequently in jurisdictions in which there is no
mandatory commitment following an acquittal.6 3 This possible advantage
is offset by the jury's reluctance at the trial stage to acquit a defendant if
they know that there is substantial chance he will be set free. Thirty-eight
states do not have automatic mandatory commitment for acquitted in-
sanity defendants; these states provide for commitment of acquitted de-
fendants under a variety of formulae: when the defendant's insanity con-
tinues,64 when he is dangerous, 65 or when a recurrence of his mental
disorder is "highly probable." 66 Three of the states permit commit-
ment of acquitted defendants only if the standards for civil commitment
61The prison society may discourage contacts with psychiatrists. See THE
SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION 93-94 (Johnston, Savitz & Wolfgang
eds. 1962) ; Von Hentig, The Limits of Penal Treatment, 32 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S.
401, 409 (1941): "The prisoner distrusts both our healing skill and our eagerness
to cure. He is, therefore, non-cooperative."
62 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82 (Supp. 1963), which provides for transfer
of insane individuals to mental institutions. It provides for transfer pursuant to a
court order and for release upon recovery.
63 See note 30 supra, in which the numerical rise in insanity acquittals is reported.
To some extent this increase is a direct result of the less stringent Durham standards,
i.e., some of these defendants would not have been acquitted under the M'Naghten
rule, but would have raised the defense anyway. However, it is clear that the
Durham rule caused increased interest in mental problems; the defense might not
have been raised in many of these cases prior to the Durham decision. See generally
Clayton, Six Years After Durham, 44 J. Azm. Jum. Soc'y 18 (1960).
The following jurisdictions reject automatic mandatory commitment, but provide
for mandatory commitment of acquitted defendants: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.110 (1962) ;
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-37 (Supp. 1961); FLA. STAT. § 919.11 (1961); HAWAII
REv. LAvs § 258-38 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2320 (1948); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1704a (Supp.
1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2575 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:3 (Supp.
1963) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (1958) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-242 (1957).
64 ALA. CODE tit 15, § 429 (1958); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026; HAWAII REv. LAws
§ 258-38 (Supp. 1961) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2320 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962) ; Ky. R. CarI. P. 9.90(2) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 59,
§ 8(a) (Supp. 1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.510 (Supp. 1962); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §94-7420 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:163-3 (1953); TEX. CODE CRmr.
PRoc. art 932b, § 1 (Supp. 1963) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-24-15 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6198 (1961). Two additional states not included in the group of thirty-eight
have rejected automatic mandatory commitment for certain classes of acquitted de-
fendants. See MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 101 (1957) (applicable to all defendants
except those charged with murder or manslaughter); MICH. Coisu. LAws § 767.27
(1948) (applicable to defendants charged with all felonies except murder).
65 ArLAsKA STAT. § 12.45.090 (1962) ; FLA. STAT. § 919.11 (1961) ; IOWA CODE
ANN. § 785.18 (1950); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2575 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§607:3 (Supp. 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84 (Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-05-03 (1960) ; OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (1958) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 136.730
(Supp. 1961); R-I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-4-7 (1956); S.D. CODE § 34.3672 (Supp.
1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4805 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-239 (1960);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.76.040 (1961).
6 6
IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1704a (Supp. 1963).
1964]
746 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:733
are met.67 The primary objection to such an arrangement is that it may
provide insufficient protection for the society. In many situations, an insane
defendant's mental illness may be in remission by the time of his trial and
acquittal; this might preclude institutionalization notwithstanding the strong
possibility that his illness may recur.
In Indiana, an acquitted defendant faces mandatory commitment if the
judge finds "the recurrence of such an attack [of insanity] is highly prob-
able."6 8 The difficulty involved in the application of this standard is
ilustrated in Wyatt v. State.69 In that case the defendant was acquitted by
reason of insanity; in the proceeding following his acquittal, three psy-
chiatrists testified on the statistical probability of a recurrence of his illness.
A fourth psychiatrist testified that he did not think defendant's illness would
recur. On the basis of this evidence the trial court ordered the defendant's
commitment to a mental institution. The state supreme court reversed
defendant's commitment on the ground that there was "no evidence of
probative value to establish a presumption . . . that this appellant, whose
liberty is here at stake, would suffer a recurrence of insanity." 70 Psy-
chiatric prediction on recurrence in a given case is fraught with difficulty; 71
even though an individual psychiatrist might be willing to act on the basis
of his prediction, it is unwise to permit the society to commit an individual
on such a basis.72
Similar problems of psychiatric prediction are encountered when man-
datory commitment is automatic for acquitted defendants who are found
dangerous. The meaning of "dangerous" is unclear; some argue that the
dangerous standard contemplates the possibility that the defendant may
commit a crime similar to the one for which he was tried.73 Other com-
mentators argue that the standard should be limited to a prediction that
the defendant is likely to engage in violent criminal activity.74
67 See note 56 supra. An additional six states fail to articulate commitment
standards for acquitted insanity defendants. See statutes cited note 81 infra. Tennes-
see, the thirty-eighth state, has no statutory provision on this subject.
68 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1704a (Supp. 1963).
69 235 Ind. 300, 133 N.E.2d 471 (1955).
70 Id. at 306, 133 N.E.2d at 475.
71 See note 29 supra.
72 See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Fahy, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d
413 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1960) ; Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness:
Some Observations on the Decision To Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 237 (1961).
73 See Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Goldstein & Katz,
supra note 72, at 235; Reid, Disposition of the Criminally Insane, 16 RUTGEas L. REv.
74, 128 (1961).
74 See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F2d 388, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Fahy, J., dis-
senting), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) ; Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Ad-
ministration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905,
945 (1961).
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The recovery standard, i.e., an acquitted defendant will be committed
unless he has recovered, is adopted by another group of states. 5 It is
similarly ambiguous-it is unclear whether or not an individual whose
illness is in a state of remission can properly be considered recovered. 76
It may be argued that mental institutions make release decisions on this
basis all the time; however, there is a significant difference in the present
situation. An acquitted defendant's mental illness has caused him to engage
in criminal activity; the consequences of a recurrence may be a repetition
of the criminal activity. If the law permitted such individuals to be set
free too easily, the protective goal would be disserved.
The use of a recovery mandatory commitment standard has further
implications when the problem of commitment procedures is analyzed. The
applicable standard-be it recovery, dangerousness, continuing insanity-
must be understandable to the individual or body which ultimately makes
the commitment decision. When a standard such as recovery or continuing
insanity is employed, however desirable it may be from a psychiatric point
of view, it may force the decision-making individual or body to become a
rubber stamp for expert testimony.
77
When a jury is the body making the determination, as it is in ten
states,78 this objection is more valid than in states which have the judge
decide the commitment issue. The judge may be more accustomed to
dealing with expert testimony since he makes commitment decisions in
involuntary civil commitment proceedings.7 " Thus, it may be more de-
sirable to have a judge rather than a jury make the commitment deter-
mination for acquitted insanity defendants.
b. Discretionary Commitment
As soon as a shift is made from mandatory to discretionary commit-
ment procedures there may be an appreciable decrease in the general as
75 
ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 429 (1958) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (commitment unless
defendant has fully recovered); HAwAII REv. LAWS § 258-38 (Supp. 1961) (defend-
ant must show recovery); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2320 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962) ; Ky. R. Cm . P. § 9.90(2) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 59, § 8(a) (Supp. 1963); MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 766.15c (1948) (applicable only
in cases other than murder); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2575 (1956) (jury must determine
whether the accused has been restored to reason and whether he is dangerous);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.510 (Supp. 1962) (jury must state whether person is entirely
and permanently recovered); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-7420 (1947) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:163-3 (1953); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 932b, § 1 (Supp. 1963);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6198 (1961).
76 See HINSlE & CAmPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 641 (3d ed. 1960), which
defines remission as an "abatement of the symptoms and signs of a disorder of disease.
The abatement may be partial or complete. Physicians use the expression remission
to denote amelioration, which even if complete for the time being, does not necessarily
imply permanent cure; in fact, the term carries the idea that the amelioration of the
symptoms is temporary."
77But see James, Jurors' Evaluation of Expert Psychiatric Testimony, 21 OHIO
ST. L.J. 75 (1960). Based on the University of Chicago's Jury Project findings, the
author discovered that 71% of the juries in the study voted against expert witnesses.
Id. at 95.
78 See note 95 infra.
79 See LINDmAN & MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 23 (1961).
There are also nonjudicial involuntary commitment procedures. See id. at 30.
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well as the individual deterrent effect of the law. In a discretionary com-
mitment jurisdiction, many of the difficulties already enumerated, e.g., jury
reluctance to acquit, will be encountered with increasing frequency. From
this perspective, discretionary commitment procedures may be objectionable
regardless of the formula.
Some of the discretionary commitment states employ commitment
formulae identical to those used by mandatory commitment states.80 How-
ever, most of the statutes which permit the judge to commit in his discre-
tion fail to provide him with any standards81 Such an approach to the
problem can hardly lead to uniform state practice--one judge may commit
insanity defendants because he feels the society needs protection, and still
another because he thinks the defendants are in need of treatment. To the
extent that a particular judge's reasons for commitment reflect the com-
munity's wishes there can be little objection to discretionary commitment
under statutes which fail to set out standards. However, articulation of the
community's long range objectives could conceivably lead to a change in
short range goals. For example, although the society's retributive instincts
might be satisfied if all acquitted defendants were punished rather than
institutionalized, the legislature may decide that in the long run it would
be better to "treat" such defendants in the hope that when they recover
they will no longer engage in criminal activity. An individual judge mak-
ing a commitment decision without legislative standards can at best effec-
tuate short range goals; even if he were able to consider long range objec-
tives before making a commitment decision, the impact of one judge's long
range program would be quite limited unless he could persuade all his col-
leagues to adopt his approach.
c. The Release Decision
Every system, whether it adopts a mandatory or discretionary com-
mitment approach to post-acquittal disposition of the insane defendant, has
SO N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84 (Supp. 1963) provides that an acquitted defendant
shall be committed after a hearing if the court finds him dangerous because of his
mental condition and if "his confinement for care, treatment, and security demands
it . . .
There is some question whether a discretionary commitment system differs in
practice from a mandatory system because of the community pressure on the individual
or body making the commitment decision which may force it to commit in every case.
See S. REl. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) :
No recent cases have come to the attention of this Committee where a
person acquitted in the District of Columbia of a crime on the sole ground
of insanity has not been committed to a mental hospital for treatment. Never-
theless, the Committee is of the opinion that the public is entitled to know
that in every case where a person has committed a crime as a result of
mental disease or defect such person shall be given a period of hospitalization
and treatment to guard against imminent recurrence of some criminal act by
that person.
S ARc. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (Supp. 1963) (commitment upon probable cause);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-37 (Supp. 1961); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 4702 (a)
(Supp. 1962) (on motion of Attorney General) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3 (1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1351 (1930); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-969 (1962).
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to provide standards and procedures which can be used for the release of
institutionalized persons. In the ordinary civil commitment situation, the
patient is released when the personnel of the mental institution determine
that he has recovered or is no longer dangerous.8 2 The procedures govern-
ing the release decision are largely informal and determined by the institu-
tion's needs. There will, as a rule, be no judicial intervention. Some
states adopt a similar approach for defendants acquitted by reason of
insanityP This may reflect a community judgment that the proper end
of commitment is treatment when provision for such release is expressly
made, or it may indicate a legislative lack of awareness of the importance
of coordinating the commitment and release decisions.84 If the legislative
goal was treatment of the offender, then it seems logical that he should be
released when he has recovered. Clearly the institution personnel are best
equipped to make this determination; so from a therapeutic point of view it
would be desirable to permit psychiatrists to make the release determina-
tion. However, once the release standard is other than the patient's re-
covery, there are less persuasive reasons for permitting institution per-
sonnel alone to make the release decision.
Most states require judicial approval before an acquitted insanity
defendant can be released; s the statutory schemes do, however, generally
permit either the institution or the patient to initiate release proceedings.
To some extent, substituting the judiciary for the institution as final arbiter
of whether a given defendant shall be released may represent a partial
rejection of the therapeutic approach; this is particularly true when the
release standard requires both that the patient have recovered and that he no
longer be dangerous. Interjection of the judiciary into this area may also
represent a community judgment that the release decision should be made
by a politically responsible group whose concern will be for community as
well as individual welfare.
States have adopted varying formulae of release standards; some
provide that acquitted defendants may be released when they are
"no longer insane," 86 when they are "entirely and permanently recov-
s2 Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481 (1954), a bill of rights for the mentally ill
which recognizes a right in the patient "to be released as soon as he is restored to
mental health and competent to manage his own affairs." This section has also been
interpreted to apply to acquitted insanity defendants in institutions. See Common-
wealth v. Jenkins, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1960).
s3 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1949).
84 Many states make no special provision for release of defendants acquitted by
reason of insanity. See collection of state statutes in LINDEAN & McINTYRE_ op.
cit. supra note 79, at 373-82.
85 E.g., OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1954) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15
(1953).
86 COLo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4(3) (1953); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-38
(1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-1705 (1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 8 (Supp. 1963); MIca. Comp. LAws
§767.27 (Supp. 1961); MrNx. STAT. § 631.19 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-2
(1953) ; N.C. GEN-. STAT. § 122-84, -86 (Supp. 1963) (general assembly assent for
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ered," s or if they "will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to [them-
selves] or others." 88 The "no longer insane" and "entirely and permanently
recovered" standards appear to disregard the possibility that some individ-
uals may be sane but dangerous. The difficulty with the "danger in the fore-
seeable future" criterion is that psychiatrists are forced to make predictions
that are beyond their competence. In addition, application of this standard
could conceivably result in life-time institutionalization for some individ-
uals. 9 The Model Penal Code adopts what may be the best approach to
the problem of release standards. It permits release of institutionalized de-
fendants when the court finds "that the person committed . . . may be
discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or others." 90
This standard takes into account the necessity of focusing on the individ-
ual's dangerousness but does not require psychiatric prediction to the extent
that the District of Columbia standard does.
The Code contemplates that the major release initiative will come from
the state officials in charge of institutions, but to prevent official lethargy
and to circumvent possible constitutional difficulties, the patient is permitted
to file release petitions at six-month intervals.' 1 Official filing of petitions
is not limited, but in the ordinary situation it is clear that the institution will
be forced to reevaluate the patient's condition at least every six months
since it knows the patient will file a request for release. Placing this
burden on the institution to reexamine all institutionalized insanity de-
fendants is desirable since it avoids the possibility of protracted confinement
due to institutional indifference. The Code wisely limits the number of
release petitions a patient may file, it is better to permit a full judicial
review of the facts every six months than to require ad hoc screening by the
court of release petitions every few weeks.
acquitted murderers; governor's order for other criminals); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.39 (Page 1958); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 932b, § 6 (Supp. 1963); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 37-93 (1953); Wis. STAT. § 957.11(4)
(1961).
Other states permit release if it is not incompatible with public welfare. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit 11, §4702(c) (Supp. 1962); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 27, § 120
(1954); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:4 (1955) (discharge by governor and council);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1304(a) (1954).
8 7 1LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).
88D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(e)(2) (1961). The District of Columbia also
requires that the patient be recovered. The proposed bill permits release of acquitted
defendants when the court is satisfied "that the committed person may be discharged
or released on probation without danger to himself or others .... " H.R. 7525,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(h) (3) (1963).
89 See ARENS & LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER 46 (1961) ; de Grazia,
The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 339 (1955) ; Goldstein & Katz,
Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision To Release
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 237 (1961) ; cf. Common-
wealth v. Jenkins, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Ct Quarter Sess. 1960).
90 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
91 Four states limit the number of release petitions which a confined individual may
file. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026a; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1705 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-24-16 (1953) ; Wis. STAT. §51.11(8) (1961).
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
2. When the Burden Is on the Prosecution
When the prosecution bears the burden of proving defendant's sanity,
mandatory commitment of such defendants is not justified from a psy-
chiatric point of view since there is no indication, at least by the verdict, that
they are or have ever been in need of medical treatment. Nevertheless,
many states provide for mandatory commitment when the burden of proof
is on the prosecution. 12  These states may have determined, in light of the
difficulty of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt,
3 that
society must be given the maximum protection. This protection could only
be provided when individuals successfully invoking the defense are institu-
tionalized. If automatic mandatory commitment is used, the burden of
proof of sanity should be placed on the defendant at trial so that a definite
judgment is made about his sanity before he is routed to a mental institution.
B. When the State's Dominant Goal Is Protection
When the state's dominant goal is protection, it is immaterial for
analytical purposes which party bears the burden of proof. The only con-
cerns are whether or not the defendant engaged in the criminal activity
and, if he did, whether he is likely to repeat this conduct.
Taking into account the unreliability of psychiatric prediction, in a state
with a protective philosophy there would be a greater tendency to provide
for automatic mandatory commitment than in a state with a therapeutic
orientation. On the other hand, some protectionists may feel that their
goal can be achieved more satisfactorily if acquitted defendants were treated
rather than merely incapacitated; in this respect the protective and thera-
peutic goals overlap. Automatic mandatory commitment may neutralize
the jury's antidefense bias although it may result in the crowding of institu-
tions with untreatables.94 For this reason, even a protectionist may reject
automatic mandatory commitment in favor of mandatory commitment for
dangerous defendants.
92 All the jurisdictions listed in note 63 supra, except Alaska, place the burden
of proving insanity on the prosecution. See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 34, at
241-72; Territory v. Adiarte, 37 Hawaii 463, 469 (1947). But see Chase v. State,
369 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1962). Seven of the thirteen jurisdictions having automatic
mandatory commitment place the burden on the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt: Colorado, District of Columbia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
and New York.
93 See Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort To Combine Law and Reason,
110 U. PA. L. Rr-v. 771, 776 (1962) : "If the prosecution must prove that disease was
absent or that the crime did not result from it, and must do so by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, then-assuming that juries are able to and do follow instructions
-the prosecution can seldom be successful."
94 A combination of the Durham rule and automatic mandatory commitment does
not appear to have resulted in institutionalization of improper subjects according to
the psychiatric staff at St. Elizabeth's. See Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1959, p. El,
col. 1, reprinted in DONNE.LLY, GoIwsTEwI & ScHvARTz, CuImnAI LAW 809 (1962).
Only five of the ninety defendants did not deserve acquittal by reason of insanity.
Four of these individuals were released in less than three months; the other spent
six months in St Elizabeth's. Id. at 810.
752 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In a predominantly protective-oriented state, there would probably be
a tendency to place the responsibility for making the release decision in the
hands of a judge and perhaps even a jury.95 The standards by which an
individual defendant's readiness for release are measured would undoubtedly
be the danger he presents to the community.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Statutory arrangements for insane defendants should balance both
treatment and protective goals. Disregarding the problem of the best ex-
culpatory rule, the best post-acquittal system seems to be mandatory com-
mitment under, perhaps, a "dangerous to himself or others" standard.96
An acquitted defendant might be committed immediately following his trial
to an institution for a sixty- or ninety-day period to permit a thorough study
to be made of his personality.97 At the conclusion of the period, there would
be a judicial inquiry. 98 The judge should have several alternative methods
of disposing of the case: if he finds the acquitted defendant "dangerous to
himself or others," the judge could commit the defendant to a mental institu-
tion; if he believes there is a possibility that the defendant's illness might
recur, the judge could, nevertheless, release him on probation; 99 or if
the judge is convinced that the defendant is not presently dangerous and
there is little possibility that he will become so in the future, he could release
the defendant unconditionally. Release of defendants committed to mental
institutions under the first alternative Would be adequately handled under
the Model Penal Code provisions governing release.100
95 Most states permit the trial judge to make the decision whether or not to
release; however, ten states permit a jury to make the determination. The trial jury
makes the determination in Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington. The judge is permitted, in his discretion, to call
a second jury in Idaho and Montana.
96This is the standard generally employed in involuntary commitment proceed-
ings; thus it is one the judge will be accustomed to applying. See note 79 mipra and
accompanying text. It would also assure the institution of receiving defendants who
were in need of treatment. See Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness,
22 U. CHi. L. REv. 325, 328 (1955).
97 Many state statutes provide for involuntary temporary or observational hos-
pitalization for a sixty- or ninety-day period. See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. Cit.
supra note 79, at 89-91. It has been assumed that such a period is sufficient for
diagnostic purposes. A similar release scheme was proposed in a Note, Procedure
for the Release of the Criminally Insane-A Suggested Approach, 1962 WASH. U.
L.Q. 120.
98 The practice in a majority of the states is that the judiciary as a politically
responsible body has some role in making the commitment decision. See text accom-
panying note 85 supra.
99 The Model Penal Code suggests probation as an alternative to complete release.
The scheme, according to the reporters, "furnishes additional protection to the public
in the case of those individuals who need some supervision upon their return to the
community." MODEL PENAL CODE §4.08(3), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Only seven states at present have such a procedure. Ibid.
10o The only real difficulty with the Model Penal Code's release proposal is
that although it limits the number of release petitions a party may file it makes no
attempt to do away with habeas corpus. Although there may be some constitutional




The implementation of this suggested post-acquittal system would both
relieve the pressure from the exculpatory rule and render interinstitutional
transfer standards less important. Formulation of an exculpatory rule to
segregate the mentally ill from the "normal" offender would be less im-
portant since employment of the mandatory commitment technique after
a hearing would, by removing the jury's antidefense bias, presumably result
in more acquittals. The procedure is also designed to insure that only those
patients in need of treatment remain institutionalized. Furthermore, under
this scheme the interinstitutional transfer provisions will be used less as a
device for correcting errors made by jurys' refusal to acquit and more as a
method of rerouting prisoners who have become mentally ill while in jail.
Provision for probation as an alternative to commitment in the Model
Penal Code represents an attempt to maintain contact with acquitted
offenders for a long period of time. Mental disorders may recur beyond
the period in which supervision by means of commitment to a mental in-
stitution would be justified; 101 probation is a less objectional method of
supervising such individuals.
Frederica B. Koller
101 Remissions may be of many years' duration. See note 49 mpra; Guttmacher,
The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CGi. L. REv. 325, 329 (1955).
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